One
observation occurred to me then, and I have thought of it ever since
with redoubled conviction; this was, that the admiral, after the
battle began, was no admiral at all: he could neither see nor be seen;
he could take no advantage of the enemy's weak points or defend his
own; his ship, the _Victory_, one of our finest three-deckers, was, in
a manner, tied up alongside a French eighty-gun ship.
These observations I have read in some naval work, and in my mind
they receive ample confirmation. I could not help feeling an agony of
anxiety (young as I was) for my country's glory, when I saw the noble
leaders of our two lines exposed to the united fire of so many ships.
I thought Nelson was too much exposed, and think so now. Experience
has confirmed what youthful fancy suggested; the enemy's centre should
have been _macadamized_ by our seven three-deckers, some of which, by
being placed in the rear, had little share in the action; and but for
the intimidation which their presence afforded, might as well have
been at Spithead. I mean no reflection on the officers who had charge
of them: accidental concurrence of light wind and station in the line,
threw them at such a distance from the enemy as kept them in the back
ground the greater part of the day.
Others, again, were in enviable situations, but did not, as far as I
could learn from the officers, do quite so much as they might have
done. This defect on our part being met by equal disadvantages,
arising from nearly similar causes, on that of the enemy, a clear
victory remained to us.
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