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1. To the mud, which rendered the progress of the French in the attack
painful and slow, and caused their first attacks to be less effective,
and prevented their being properly sustained by the artillery.
2. To the original formation of very deep columns on the part of the
French, principally on the right wing.
3. To the want of unity in the employment of the three arms: the
infantry and cavalry made a number of charges alternating with each
other, but they were in no case simultaneous.
4. Finally and chiefly, to the unexpected arrival of the whole Prussian
army at the decisive moment on the right flank, if not the rear, of the
French.
Every experienced military man will agree that, in spite of the mud and
the firmness of the English infantry, if the mass of the French infantry
had been thrown on the English in columns of battalions immediately
after the great charge of cavalry, the combined army would have been
broken and forced back on Antwerp. Independently of this, if the
Prussians had not arrived, the English would have been compelled to
retreat; and I maintain that this battle cannot justly be cited as proof
of the superiority of musketry-fire over well-directed attacks in
columns.
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