In general terms, such a camp on a river, with a large _tete de pont_
on the other side to command both banks, and near a large fortified city
like Mayence or Strasbourg, is of undoubted advantage; but it will never
be more than a temporary refuge, a means of gaining time and of
collecting reinforcements. When the object is to drive away the enemy,
it will be necessary to leave the camp and carry on operations in the
open country.
The second maxim as to these camps is, that they are particularly
advantageous to an army at home or near its base of operations. If a
French army occupied an intrenched camp on the Elbe, it would be lost
when the space between the Rhine and Elbe was held by the enemy; but if
it were invested in an intrenched camp near Strasbourg, it might with a
little assistance resume its superiority and take the field, while the
enemy in the interior of France and between the relieving force and the
intrenched army would have great difficulty in recrossing the Rhine.
We have heretofore considered these camps in a strategic light; but
several German generals have maintained that they are suitable to cover
places or to prevent sieges,--which appears to me to be a little
sophistical.
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